[00:00:00] The city of Tipton was scammed out of nearly $50,000 after a business they normally work with was impersonated by cybercriminals.
[00:00:09] And they contacted us and said, hey, can y'all maybe change this to an electronic payment instead of just the check?
[00:00:14] And we were like, sure, OK, because it wasn't referenced to a legitimate invoice.
[00:00:19] Tipton's director of communications tells me that after they canceled the original check and sent the electronic payment,
[00:00:25] they were contacted by the legitimate company and soon realized they had been the target of a scam.
[00:00:31] We're very lucky in that as a big organization, we have insurance.
[00:00:35] I mean, we do want people to know that this is such an isolated incident.
[00:00:39] We hate that it happened. We're doing everything we can to get every dime back of that.
[00:00:43] But it happens.
[00:00:56] I must respectfully throw a bullshit flag on this.
[00:01:00] Scams against governments are not rare.
[00:01:02] It's so common that I had to limit most of the stories I'll tell you today to losses of more than six figures.
[00:01:14] These scams are particularly bad because they don't just involve one person.
[00:01:18] They involve all taxpayers.
[00:01:21] They're all being robbed.
[00:01:23] After producing more than 100 episodes of Scams and Cons,
[00:01:27] I can tell you this has been the easiest and the most expensive one I've done.
[00:01:32] It's the easiest because of the huge number of scams run against governments.
[00:01:37] It was expensive on several levels,
[00:01:39] but mostly because of the audio transcripts I needed to write this script.
[00:01:44] Taxpayers had it worse.
[00:01:46] Much worse.
[00:01:48] How much is lost?
[00:01:49] It's easily in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
[00:01:52] but we don't know exactly because governments aren't that forthcoming in revealing a scam.
[00:01:57] Before we get into the actual scams,
[00:01:59] let me tell you how I define scams for this episode.
[00:02:03] In most cases,
[00:02:05] I use a rough definition of one or more people scamming an individual.
[00:02:09] If I use that definition here,
[00:02:11] it would creep into the category of fraud,
[00:02:14] where someone on the inside directs money elsewhere for their own benefit.
[00:02:18] The guideline here was that there must be a third party,
[00:02:22] someone who slips between a government and an honest person to con the government out of its money.
[00:02:28] The victims were taxpayers,
[00:02:30] but the person who enabled the scam didn't know they had a role in it.
[00:02:33] They likely just clicked on a link or tried to help a vendor.
[00:02:37] Most scams against governments happen in two ways.
[00:02:41] There's a third, and we'll get into that later.
[00:02:53] The first way is through social engineering.
[00:02:56] That requires scammers to convince someone inside the city, county, or school
[00:03:01] to give up or change information in a database.
[00:03:06] That usually happens via a supposedly legitimate email to someone inside the public agency.
[00:03:14] The second uses the same seemingly legitimate email
[00:03:17] that allows scammers to steal data from a government.
[00:03:20] It's then used to scam employees
[00:03:23] or simply sell it on the darknet so other scammers can take a run at you.
[00:03:30] Here's an example.
[00:03:31] The Justice Department blamed a Tennessee couple
[00:03:34] for a scheme that defrauded the Pentagon's health program
[00:03:37] of more than $65 million.
[00:03:40] It involved some active duty service members
[00:03:43] who will serve time and must pay the federal government back.
[00:03:50] One half of the couple, Jimmy Collins,
[00:03:53] was sentenced to 10 years in prison,
[00:03:55] the maximum he could have received for the charge,
[00:03:57] while Ashley Collins will serve 18 months in home confinement
[00:04:01] for conspiracy, according to Military.com.
[00:04:08] From 2014 to 2015,
[00:04:11] the Collinses created a medical network of doctors
[00:04:14] and a nurse practitioner.
[00:04:16] They used other TRICARE beneficiaries
[00:04:18] to get service members to receive specialty medications
[00:04:21] they didn't need.
[00:04:23] In return, they got kickbacks.
[00:04:29] TRICARE, by the way,
[00:04:30] is a health program run to benefit active-duty military personnel.
[00:04:43] The prescriptions were then filled by a pharmacy
[00:04:45] in Bountiful, Utah,
[00:04:47] which billed TRICARE at amounts of $10,000
[00:04:49] and in some cases up to $20,000 per prescription,
[00:04:53] enough for the Collinses to cover the costs
[00:04:55] of beneficiaries' co-payments,
[00:04:57] provide payments to participants,
[00:04:59] and spend lavishly on themselves.
[00:05:12] According to the Justice Department,
[00:05:14] the Collinses enjoyed a lavish lifestyle.
[00:05:17] It included an 82-foot yacht,
[00:05:20] two Aston Martins,
[00:05:21] and other luxury vehicles.
[00:05:23] They had three parcels of real estate in Tennessee,
[00:05:26] gold and silver bars,
[00:05:28] and a multi-million dollar investment annuity.
[00:05:33] A more typical case is illustrated
[00:05:35] by a Texas school district.
[00:05:37] A school district in Texas
[00:05:39] lost about $2.3 million
[00:05:41] due to a phishing email scam.
[00:05:43] Now the FBI is investigating.
[00:05:45] Police tell KEYE Manor ISD,
[00:05:48] serving areas of Austin,
[00:05:49] Pflugerville, and more,
[00:05:51] was the victim of an online scam in November.
[00:05:53] Police say the loss happened
[00:05:54] through three separate fraudulent charges.
[00:05:57] An IT expert tells KEYE
[00:05:59] phishing scams can often show up
[00:06:00] as disguised email addresses,
[00:06:02] phone numbers, or fake links.
[00:06:04] West Milwaukee and West Allis
[00:06:06] are suburbs of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
[00:06:08] The two communities share a school district.
[00:06:11] CBS 58 tells about money stolen
[00:06:14] from the school district.
[00:06:15] According to court documents
[00:06:16] that we uncovered today,
[00:06:18] back in September,
[00:06:19] a district employee got an email
[00:06:20] from someone saying
[00:06:21] they were from C.G. Schmidt,
[00:06:23] a company hired to build
[00:06:25] a new rec and community services center,
[00:06:27] and that they needed to send
[00:06:28] some banking information.
[00:06:30] What the district employee did not notice
[00:06:32] was the email address was fake,
[00:06:34] with two Ns instead of an M in Schmidt.
[00:06:38] So when the district sent a payment
[00:06:40] of more than $840,000,
[00:06:42] they thought it was going to C.G. Schmidt,
[00:06:44] but the company never got it.
[00:06:46] The West Allis Police Department
[00:06:48] says their initial investigation
[00:06:49] led them to different spots
[00:06:51] around the country,
[00:06:52] but say it's likely money
[00:06:53] was transferred overseas.
[00:06:55] Because of that,
[00:06:56] in the complexity of the case,
[00:06:57] it was turned over to the FBI.
[00:06:59] In a statement,
[00:07:00] the district's director of finance
[00:07:02] and operations said
[00:07:03] they do not expect this
[00:07:04] to impact the construction
[00:07:05] of the rec and community services center,
[00:07:08] and that they've made changes
[00:07:09] to address their online banking process
[00:07:11] and will provide education
[00:07:13] and training for email fraud
[00:07:15] and phishing attacks.
[00:07:16] When I come back,
[00:07:17] I'm going to take the city of Atlanta
[00:07:19] and Fulton County to task.
[00:07:23] I'm interrupting myself
[00:07:25] because I need your help.
[00:07:26] In nearly three years,
[00:07:28] I've produced more than 100 episodes
[00:07:30] of Scams and Cons.
[00:07:31] By choice,
[00:07:33] I paid all the bills
[00:07:34] out of my pocket.
[00:07:35] But now it's time
[00:07:36] to take the show
[00:07:37] to the next level,
[00:07:38] and I need your help.
[00:07:39] I'd like you to become
[00:07:40] a supporter of the podcast.
[00:07:43] Like a lot of shows,
[00:07:44] I'm using Patreon
[00:07:45] to make that possible.
[00:07:47] Unlike other shows,
[00:07:49] your support won't buy
[00:07:50] any special episodes
[00:07:51] that others don't get to hear.
[00:07:53] I value all my listeners,
[00:07:55] and I don't like separating them
[00:07:57] into the haves or have-nots.
[00:07:59] So here's my ask.
[00:08:01] Visit patreon.com
[00:08:03] and search for Scams and Cons.
[00:08:05] Pick a support level
[00:08:07] that's right for you
[00:08:08] and sign up.
[00:08:09] If you want to know
[00:08:10] the details of what it costs
[00:08:11] to produce the podcast,
[00:08:13] read the About section
[00:08:14] where I lay it out.
[00:08:16] You can do that
[00:08:17] before picking a level of support.
[00:08:20] Regardless,
[00:08:21] the podcast will always
[00:08:22] be free to hear,
[00:08:23] and I hope you'll show me
[00:08:24] some love by becoming
[00:08:25] a supporter.
[00:08:26] Thanks.
[00:08:27] Now back to the show.
[00:08:31] I mentioned a third way
[00:08:33] scammers con money
[00:08:34] out of governments,
[00:08:35] and that's ransomware.
[00:08:37] What happens is that
[00:08:38] a seemingly innocent email
[00:08:40] goes to someone
[00:08:41] inside a government,
[00:08:42] and when they click a link,
[00:08:43] a virus locks up
[00:08:44] their computers,
[00:08:45] and the scammers
[00:08:46] demand money
[00:08:47] to restore the system.
[00:08:48] Many of these scammers
[00:08:50] protect hospitals
[00:08:51] and emergency services
[00:08:52] from the attack,
[00:08:53] but not always.
[00:08:55] Coverlink,
[00:08:56] an insurance company
[00:08:57] that protects governments
[00:08:58] and businesses
[00:08:59] from such things,
[00:09:00] was alerted when Atlanta
[00:09:01] was held for ransom.
[00:09:03] The attack was in
[00:09:04] March of 2018.
[00:09:06] Coverlink did a case story
[00:09:08] on the attack,
[00:09:09] noting that the city
[00:09:10] refused to pay the ransom.
[00:09:12] AI voice Tamika
[00:09:13] reads from that study,
[00:09:14] The city of Atlanta
[00:09:16] refused to reward
[00:09:17] the cyber criminals
[00:09:18] and did not pay
[00:09:20] the ransom.
[00:09:21] As a result,
[00:09:22] the city of Atlanta
[00:09:23] ransomware attack
[00:09:24] took several months
[00:09:25] to recover from,
[00:09:26] disrupting various
[00:09:28] government services
[00:09:29] for extended periods
[00:09:30] and costing millions
[00:09:31] of dollars in damage.
[00:09:33] This incident
[00:09:34] has become known
[00:09:35] as one of the
[00:09:36] costliest cyber attacks
[00:09:37] to impact a local government.
[00:09:39] The attack compromised
[00:09:41] critical technology
[00:09:42] and information
[00:09:43] across Atlanta,
[00:09:44] interrupting key
[00:09:46] municipal functions
[00:09:47] within several
[00:09:48] city departments.
[00:09:49] In particular,
[00:09:50] the incident
[00:09:51] disrupted online
[00:09:52] payment programs
[00:09:53] for various services
[00:09:54] such as utilities,
[00:09:56] traffic tickets
[00:09:57] and business licenses
[00:09:58] or renewals,
[00:10:00] and a multitude
[00:10:01] of law enforcement
[00:10:02] operations,
[00:10:03] including warrant
[00:10:04] issuances,
[00:10:05] inmate processing
[00:10:06] protocols,
[00:10:07] and court fee payments.
[00:10:09] Further,
[00:10:10] the Atlanta
[00:10:11] Police Department
[00:10:12] lost access
[00:10:13] to practically
[00:10:13] all of its
[00:10:15] archived-in-vehicle
[00:10:16] video footage
[00:10:17] and even had
[00:10:18] to temporarily
[00:10:19] resort to writing
[00:10:20] incident reports
[00:10:21] by hand.
[00:10:22] As part of the
[00:10:23] ransomware attack,
[00:10:24] the cybercriminals
[00:10:26] demanded the payment
[00:10:27] of over $50,000
[00:10:28] in Bitcoin
[00:10:29] before restoring
[00:10:31] any technology
[00:10:32] or information
[00:10:33] for the Atlanta
[00:10:34] government.
[00:10:35] However,
[00:10:36] the city refused
[00:10:37] to comply
[00:10:39] with the cybercriminals'
[00:10:40] demands.
[00:10:41] Government officials
[00:10:42] did not want to
[00:10:43] reward the cybercriminals'
[00:10:45] behavior with payment,
[00:10:47] nor were they
[00:10:48] convinced that such
[00:10:49] a payment would
[00:10:49] result in restoration.
[00:10:51] Wired magazine
[00:10:52] said the city of
[00:10:54] Atlanta spent more
[00:10:54] than $2.6 million
[00:10:56] on emergency efforts
[00:10:57] to respond to the
[00:10:58] attack.
[00:10:59] The scammers
[00:11:00] asked for a ransom
[00:11:01] of roughly $50,000
[00:11:02] worth of Bitcoin.
[00:11:04] That cost depends
[00:11:05] upon the value
[00:11:06] of Bitcoin
[00:11:07] at the time.
[00:11:08] Atlanta officials
[00:11:09] haven't said whether
[00:11:10] they paid the ransom
[00:11:11] or even tried,
[00:11:12] but it seems they
[00:11:13] may not have had
[00:11:14] the chance.
[00:11:15] The attackers
[00:11:15] quickly took the
[00:11:16] payment portal offline
[00:11:17] and left the city
[00:11:19] to fend for itself.
[00:11:20] The recovery has been
[00:11:22] far more costly
[00:11:23] than the initial demand.
[00:11:25] You'd think
[00:11:26] Atlanta-area
[00:11:27] governments
[00:11:27] would have gotten
[00:11:28] the message,
[00:11:28] but in February
[00:11:30] 2023,
[00:11:31] CNN reported
[00:11:32] that Fulton County,
[00:11:34] which includes
[00:11:34] parts of Atlanta,
[00:11:36] said financially
[00:11:36] motivated hackers
[00:11:38] appeared to be
[00:11:38] behind a ransomware
[00:11:39] attack that has
[00:11:40] disrupted key
[00:11:41] county services.
[00:11:43] CNN said the news
[00:11:45] came nearly two
[00:11:46] and a half weeks
[00:11:46] after the county
[00:11:47] first acknowledged
[00:11:48] a cybersecurity
[00:11:49] incident was
[00:11:50] causing disruptions.
[00:11:52] CNN said the group
[00:11:53] was called Lockbit.
[00:11:55] Lockbit has
[00:11:56] Russian-speaking
[00:11:56] members,
[00:11:57] but it also has
[00:11:58] criminal partners
[00:11:59] in multiple countries
[00:12:00] that rent the
[00:12:01] ransomware
[00:12:02] and use it
[00:12:02] for attacks.
[00:12:03] Here's Rob Pitts,
[00:12:05] head of the Fulton
[00:12:06] County Commission
[00:12:06] at a press conference.
[00:12:07] Now, I also want
[00:12:09] to address
[00:12:10] speculation
[00:12:10] about whether
[00:12:12] Fulton County
[00:12:13] paid a ransom
[00:12:15] for our data.
[00:12:16] After careful
[00:12:17] consideration
[00:12:18] and weighing
[00:12:19] many, many factors,
[00:12:21] the Board of
[00:12:22] Commissioners
[00:12:22] decided that
[00:12:23] we could not
[00:12:25] in good conscience
[00:12:26] use Fulton County
[00:12:28] taxpayer funds
[00:12:30] to make a payment.
[00:12:31] We did not pay,
[00:12:34] nor did anyone
[00:12:35] pay on our behalf.
[00:12:37] We cannot speculate
[00:12:39] as to why
[00:12:39] Lockbit removed
[00:12:40] Fulton County
[00:12:41] from their dark
[00:12:42] website this past
[00:12:43] Friday.
[00:12:44] As to the question
[00:12:46] of whether
[00:12:46] personal data
[00:12:47] of the county's
[00:12:47] citizens is affected?
[00:12:49] I want to be
[00:12:50] straightforward with
[00:12:51] you and transparent.
[00:12:53] We still do not
[00:12:54] know.
[00:12:55] It's more important
[00:12:56] to me that you
[00:12:57] hear the truth
[00:12:58] than I tell you
[00:12:59] something that ends
[00:13:00] up being wrong
[00:13:01] further down
[00:13:02] the road.
[00:13:03] We want to
[00:13:04] get this right
[00:13:05] and this review
[00:13:06] requires our teams
[00:13:07] to lead an
[00:13:08] extensive e-discovery
[00:13:10] process to
[00:13:11] carefully understand
[00:13:12] and review any
[00:13:13] data believed
[00:13:14] to be affected.
[00:13:15] But if we
[00:13:16] determine that
[00:13:17] people's personal
[00:13:18] information was
[00:13:19] involved in this
[00:13:20] incident, we will
[00:13:21] make all legally
[00:13:23] required notifications.
[00:13:24] We plan to
[00:13:26] provide affected
[00:13:27] individuals with
[00:13:28] resources to
[00:13:29] help protect
[00:13:30] their personal
[00:13:31] information.
[00:13:32] Each attack
[00:13:33] is different,
[00:13:34] but it's
[00:13:34] disconcerting that
[00:13:35] the Atlanta area
[00:13:36] would be hit twice
[00:13:37] in a period of a
[00:13:38] few years.
[00:13:39] There are plenty
[00:13:40] more disaster
[00:13:41] tales to tell,
[00:13:42] and we'll tell
[00:13:43] them after the
[00:13:43] break.
[00:13:49] Hey there, I'm
[00:13:50] James, host of
[00:13:51] Dakota Spotlight.
[00:13:51] We're back with
[00:13:52] a new season,
[00:13:53] You Killed Chris,
[00:13:54] A Friend's Fight
[00:13:55] for Justice.
[00:13:56] It's a chilling
[00:13:56] throwback to 1968.
[00:13:58] A college freshman,
[00:14:00] Christine Rothschild,
[00:14:01] is murdered on
[00:14:01] campus during her
[00:14:02] morning walk.
[00:14:03] Join us as we
[00:14:04] dive into this
[00:14:05] unsolved
[00:14:05] case and follow
[00:14:06] a friend's
[00:14:07] relentless pursuit
[00:14:08] of the truth
[00:14:08] all the way from
[00:14:09] the flower power
[00:14:10] era to today.
[00:14:11] Binge You Killed
[00:14:12] Chris on your
[00:14:13] favorite app or
[00:14:14] at dakotaspotlight.com.
[00:14:22] Time for some
[00:14:23] rapid fire examples
[00:14:24] from KOMO in
[00:14:26] Olympia, Washington.
[00:14:27] The Olympia
[00:14:28] School District
[00:14:29] Headquarters has
[00:14:30] all kinds of
[00:14:30] security systems in
[00:14:31] place, but
[00:14:32] yesterday they
[00:14:33] discovered someone
[00:14:34] was able to gain
[00:14:35] access to crucial
[00:14:36] information by
[00:14:37] posing as
[00:14:38] Superintendent
[00:14:39] Dix of a
[00:14:40] Tannish by using
[00:14:41] the technique of
[00:14:42] phishing or
[00:14:43] masquerading as a
[00:14:44] trustworthy entity.
[00:14:45] In a statement,
[00:14:46] the district said,
[00:14:47] We learned at the
[00:14:48] end of the workday
[00:14:49] yesterday that we
[00:14:50] had a district data
[00:14:51] breach.
[00:14:51] The phish resulted in
[00:14:53] an outside entity
[00:14:54] spoofing the email
[00:14:55] address of the
[00:14:56] superintendent.
[00:14:57] The fake email
[00:14:58] requested the names,
[00:14:59] addresses, salary
[00:15:00] information, and
[00:15:01] social security
[00:15:02] numbers of every
[00:15:03] employee.
[00:15:04] The first three
[00:15:05] items are readily
[00:15:06] available on the
[00:15:06] internet, but not
[00:15:07] the social security
[00:15:08] numbers, which can be
[00:15:09] used to access
[00:15:10] personal finances.
[00:15:11] The district said,
[00:15:12] This morning we've
[00:15:13] been working with
[00:15:14] security experts,
[00:15:15] legal counsel,
[00:15:16] insurance carrier,
[00:15:17] and the district
[00:15:18] technology team
[00:15:19] regarding a number of
[00:15:21] issues associated with
[00:15:22] this breach of
[00:15:22] information.
[00:15:24] KVIA tells about how
[00:15:25] El Paso was taken
[00:15:26] for a ride.
[00:15:28] They assure me
[00:15:28] the scam was
[00:15:29] isolated.
[00:15:31] It's not like we
[00:15:32] were discovering
[00:15:32] something that we,
[00:15:34] oh, we need to
[00:15:34] change something.
[00:15:35] The systems are
[00:15:36] governed by how
[00:15:38] the software is set
[00:15:38] up, how the people
[00:15:39] interface with the
[00:15:40] software, the
[00:15:41] divisions of duties.
[00:15:42] So all of those
[00:15:43] controls are in place
[00:15:44] and this one is one
[00:15:45] of those rare
[00:15:45] circumstances that a
[00:15:47] scammer was able to
[00:15:48] succeed.
[00:15:49] What could have
[00:15:49] happened?
[00:15:50] Dr. Luke Longper
[00:15:51] from Sit With UTEP
[00:15:52] says the method could
[00:15:53] be used to have
[00:15:54] someone that changed
[00:15:55] the bank account of
[00:15:56] an existing vendor,
[00:15:57] but these cases are
[00:15:59] very sophisticated
[00:15:59] and anyone could
[00:16:01] be behind it.
[00:16:01] Could be anything.
[00:16:03] We don't have a
[00:16:03] profile of who is
[00:16:05] doing this.
[00:16:05] It could be local
[00:16:06] people, it could be
[00:16:07] foreign people, and
[00:16:08] it could be local
[00:16:09] people that do it
[00:16:11] from a foreign
[00:16:11] side because they
[00:16:12] go to some other
[00:16:13] country where the
[00:16:14] laws against these
[00:16:16] kind of things are
[00:16:16] weaker so that if
[00:16:18] they are found,
[00:16:19] they're less
[00:16:20] liable to bad
[00:16:22] consequences.
[00:16:23] I mean, it's like
[00:16:24] organized crime.
[00:16:26] So what's a poor
[00:16:27] taxpayer to do?
[00:16:29] The first thing is to
[00:16:30] lock down your credit
[00:16:31] reports by going to
[00:16:32] the three big reporting
[00:16:33] agencies, Equifax,
[00:16:36] Experian, and
[00:16:37] TransUnion.
[00:16:38] Once you join up and
[00:16:40] it doesn't cost you
[00:16:40] anything, put a lock on
[00:16:42] your report.
[00:16:43] That means no one can
[00:16:44] access your credit
[00:16:45] unless you approve it.
[00:16:47] Odds are you'll forget
[00:16:48] about it until the next
[00:16:49] time you apply for a
[00:16:50] credit card or bank
[00:16:51] loan.
[00:16:52] They'll then ask you to
[00:16:53] open your account so
[00:16:54] they can see your credit
[00:16:55] report.
[00:16:56] Once you open it and
[00:16:57] they get their
[00:16:58] information, lock it
[00:17:00] back down again.
[00:17:01] That still leaves you
[00:17:02] open to phishing attacks
[00:17:04] like the ones that
[00:17:04] infected all these
[00:17:05] public institutions.
[00:17:07] Even if the person on
[00:17:08] the other end of the
[00:17:09] phone, text, or email
[00:17:10] seems to have correct
[00:17:12] information on you,
[00:17:13] they're likely to try to
[00:17:14] get more or have you
[00:17:15] confirm the information
[00:17:16] they already have.
[00:17:18] And if you don't know
[00:17:19] the person sending the
[00:17:20] email, don't open it.
[00:17:22] There's one more thing
[00:17:24] you can do.
[00:17:25] Since these institutions
[00:17:26] are run by elected
[00:17:27] representatives, call
[00:17:29] yours and find out what
[00:17:30] protections are in
[00:17:31] place.
[00:17:32] More importantly, find
[00:17:34] out what training
[00:17:35] employees get in
[00:17:36] recognizing phishing
[00:17:37] attempts.
[00:17:38] That training is the
[00:17:40] single most effective
[00:17:41] thing to do.
[00:17:42] It's your money.
[00:17:44] Make sure it's safe
[00:17:45] and is spent on
[00:17:46] projects that the
[00:17:47] people have approved.
[00:17:51] If you enjoy Scams
[00:17:53] and Cons, tell your
[00:17:55] friends and encourage
[00:17:56] them to listen.
[00:17:57] You can find Scams
[00:17:59] and Cons wherever
[00:17:59] podcasts are found.
[00:18:01] And please give us a
[00:18:03] five-star rating wherever
[00:18:04] you listen.
[00:18:05] Your ratings really do
[00:18:06] make a difference.
[00:18:07] Lastly, I'd be
[00:18:09] grateful if you'd
[00:18:10] support the show
[00:18:11] via Patreon.
[00:18:12] Your support will
[00:18:13] help the podcast grow
[00:18:14] to the next level.
[00:18:16] Just go to
[00:18:16] Patreon.com and
[00:18:18] search for Scams
[00:18:19] and Cons or use
[00:18:20] the link in the show
[00:18:21] notes.
[00:18:22] Thanks for listening.